LAHAINA FIRE: The failure of fire, law enforcement, and other agencies at the 2023 Maui fires

 ~ By Chuck Sheley, retired smokejumper (Cave Junction 1959)
and current NSA Smokejumper Magazine editor

As part of our family drove along the Lahaina Bypass Road on July 5, 2023, I mentioned to my son that I had never seen things so dry in the 20+ years that we have been going to Maui. The bypass road ran by Lahaina a quarter mile or so up the hill from that historic town. The area between the town and the bypass was solid grass a couple of feet tall. With the continual downhill winds, I mentioned that this was a disaster waiting to happen. On August 8, it happened. Lahaina was a historic town and a major tourist attraction. Years of history there.

I’ve always wondered about the Hawaiian “Hang Loose” attitude, but their house, their attitude. You can substitute incompetence for Hang Loose in this fire. Let’s look at what happened at Lahaina, where over 100 people died. Could it have been prevented? Were fire and law enforcement caught off guard? Definitely not! They just ignored the inevitable.

The Warning: In 2021 a Maui County commissioned report, County of Maui Report on Wildfire Prevention, was released. A summary: Wild/brush/ forest fires appear to be increasing; wild/brush/ forest fires present a growing threat to Maui County citizens; there are ongoing fire threats to Maui Island: grasses and combustible materials along road rights-of-way; low-hanging, failure, or shorting of above-ground powerlines.

The report included comments on Maui County’s Fire and Safety Response: “Prevention is given short shrift. There is no stated goal of fire prevention or any metric to assess success or improvement in prevention. There is much space devoted to preventing injuries and illness of employees and to preventing equipment failure, but nothing about what can and should be done to prevent fires.”

They were told wildfire is coming. However, they respond with employee concerns. How about the citizens? Sounds like an employee union response.

2014: Michael Walker, Hawaii’s Fire Protection Forester, urged state lawmakers to make a relatively meager financial commitment to boost wildfire preparedness: about $1.5 million. That money would have funded new firebreaks, livestock grazing, and water infrastructure for firefighting. The bill died in committee.

National Weather Service data shows that in the last 17 years, the NWS  issued 65 red flag warnings or fire weather watches for the area, including Lahaina.

When the predicted happened: The New York Times published an excellent report, with video, on this disaster from start to finish. “A cascade of failures by officials left thousands trapped and largely fending for themselves.”

Conditions: The NWS forecasted hurricane-force gusts up to 76 mph, with winds accelerating down the slopes leading into Lahaina. Using the NYTimes as a source, we have the following timeline: Shortly after sunrise on August 8, a powerline snapped and started a fire. Firefighters responded and contained the fire. Crew left site at 2:18 p.m. and returned to station. A 911 call at 2:52 p.m. as fire started again. (Fire Dept. did not leave anyone on the fire and did not make sure it was out.) At 3:22 p.m. fire jumped Lahaina Bypass and at 3:51 p.m., a Lahaina resident texted, “We are trapped.” At 4:13 p.m. fire spread across total area. Emergency managers chose not to activate the siren system, fearing people would evacuate TOWARD the fire. (Evacuate uphill toward a fire pushed by 70 mph winds?) 4:16 p.m. officials issued an evacuation alert via cellphones. But by then, the fire had already burned through the evacuation zone — 20 minutes earlier.

By 4:19 p.m. the fire had crossed Front Street. Roads were blocked. At 4:35 p.m. a caller to 911 said, “The roads are closed, I can’t turn out.” Roads blocked by downed powerlines, but Hawaii Electric said that the powerlines had been de-energized for hours. No one told the police who were blocking the escape routes. (No coordination between agencies.) 4:45 p.m. gridlock. Front Street blocked. Firefighters said they were losing water pressure. (Water and hoses against a wildfire pushed by 70 mph winds?) 6:00 p.m. Maui County mayor said he was “happy to report” the opening of the roads that had been blocked.

Honolulu Civil Beat: Maui County has known the town of Lahaina and its neighboring communities were the island’s most at risk for wildfires for years, with alarms being raised at least as far back as 2018. According to the county’s hazard mitigation plan developed in 2020, West Maui had a 90 percent chance of annual wildfires. Lahaina and the area around Maalaea were identified as being of highest concern.

Hawaii News Now: HNN obtained the report as part of an ongoing investigation of the county’s actions before, during, and after the wildfire that leveled Lahaina. Two months after the disaster, which claimed at least 99 lives with six others still unaccounted for, it’s clear that the wildfire threat was well-documented — the result of poor land management, inadequate planning, and drought. Escape routes blocked: As a reader, you can go to youtube and see videos taken by residents trying to escape Lahaina. Cars are backed up on Front Street, side by side and not moving. If the north end of Front Street had not been blocked by law enforcement, cars could have easily moved to safety in the large parking lots at Safeway — or driven farther north to safety. Some people drove around the blockage, but that didn’t help those trapped in line a mile back.

Associated Press (8/23/23): As flames tore through a West Maui neighborhood, car after car of fleeing residents headed for the only paved road out of town in a desperate race for safety. And car after car was turned back toward the rapidly spreading wildfire by a barricade blocking access to Highway 30. During a news conference on Tuesday, Maui Police Chief John Pelletier said, “So the police were blocking roads, the exit, some of the exit roads out. And I’m assuming it’s because there’s been some downed powerlines or some downed trees.”

In another news report: This week, Maui’s police chief explained why barricades were set up. “Downed powerlines, which would kill you if you drove over them,” said MPD Chief John Pelletier. Danger from downed powerlines: We know or should know that downed powerlines present a danger. The rule: Do not exit the vehicle, stay inside. Other references: A powerline is the source (electricity), so the only place it will want to flow is to ground. A vehicle sits atop rubber tires which provide an insulator, so the occupant would be insulated. Since the vehicle does not provide a path to ground, driving over a powerline would not pose a risk for the insulated occupant. (Trained officers and the Fire Chief should know this.)

Common sense is uncommon: We have a situation where a town is engulfed by a 70 mph wind-driven fire. Exit roads are blocked, and cars are jammed and not moving. Even as a law enforcement official, if you did not know that a vehicle could drive safely over downed powerlines, could you see the alternative — being burned to death by a wildfire? People with off-road vehicles ignored the barriers and drove around them to safety. Was there any power in those lines?

“By 6:40 a.m., there was no power to Lahaina or West Maui, according to Darren Pai, a spokesman for Hawaiian Electric.” (Honolulu Civil Beat)

Bottom line: There was plenty of advance warning, some back as far as 2014, that this wildfire would happen. Whoever was at the top of the food chain should have put fire, law enforcement, medical, and Hawaiian Electric into a room and devised a plan to coordinate all these agencies.

After the Camp Fire in Paradise, California, which destroyed a town of 26,000 people in a matter of hours, all of Maui should have been aware of the need to shut down powerlines during high-wind events. Coordination between fire and law enforcement is also at the top of the list. Each seemed to be operating independently of the other in Lahaina. I still cannot understand how law enforcement officers could block escape routes. That is like locking people inside a burning building.

Maui should have had trained wildland firefighters. Anyone thinking that the loss of water pressure was a factor here does not have much knowledge of wildfire. You don’t face down an advancing wildfire pushed by 70 mph winds with a hose. Time spent spraying water on a burning house, surrounded by 30 other burning houses, is a waste of time. Forget the houses and concentrate on evacuating people.

How many eventual victims could have been saved if those roadblocks were removed? After the Camp Fire in Paradise, I’ve championed the establishment of “safe zones” rather than road evacuation. It didn’t work in Paradise, and it didn’t work in Maui. There is a concrete parking garage at the north end of Lahaina. I would bet that 500-600 people could have sheltered in place there. Athletic and play fields at the schools were other possible safe zones. There are many experts in planning and coordinating wildfire efforts. Because the local officials on Maui, with years of advance warning, couldn’t properly prepare for a disaster, bring in some experts from the mainland.

Best description of the Maui wildfire — fiasco!

Chuck Sheley (Cave Junction ’59) graduated from Chico State University in 1960. He taught Physical Education for 36 years and coached track and cross country in Chico for 53 years. After two seasons on an engine crew on the  Lassen National Forest, he jumped at Cave Junction 1959-66, then out of  Fairbanks 1967-1970. Sheley was the organized crew coordinator for the Mendocino National Forest for 19 years, where he recruited and trained 300 new firefighters each year. He finished his fire career with 34 seasons in wildland firefighting, and he’s still coaching and officiating Track & Field and has served as editor of Smokejumper magazine since 1999 — he’s also the vice president of the National Smokejumper Association.