Australia’s Green Triangle Fire Alliance (GTFA) has acquired on a 3-year lease a new Bell 204B firefighting helicopter. Equipped with a 1,250-liter bucket — about 330 gallons — the 204B carries more water than the B2 Squirrel hired by GTFA in 2022.
The Border Watch reported that the Green Triangle’s timber plantation companies are investing in firefighting upgrades to increase protection for plantation estates, the natural environment, and the community. The nine forest companies in the GTFA will fund operations for as-needed locations in the region. An investment into floating collar tanks was also made, supplying water to the helicopter in areas with limited surface water.
GTFA General Manager Anthony Walsh said the helicopter’s 1,250-litre bucket could draw water from a variety of sources. “This helicopter is highly complementary to the fixed-wing firebombers that operate in the region,” Walsh said.
According to AirMed&Rescue, the helicopter is registered as VH-EJL and owned by Forest Air Helicopters out of New South Wales. Forest Air Helicopters provides Australia-wide aviation services and is based on the NSW/VIC border at Albury.
The Green Triangle [PDF] region is on the southern coast, spanning the border between South Australia and Victoria. The GTFA includes a broad-based lumber industry and thus is susceptible to an above-average summertime fire risk.
The helicopter was contracted by the government of Victoria; it will come on as a part of the Victorian fleet, based in Casterton for the 14-week summer fire season — unlike other aircraft that are usually relocated as needed. “Other aircraft may leave the region to attend fires elsewhere across Victoria and South Australia,” explained Walsh, “but this helicopter will remain at its Casterton base for the 14-week service period until March.” It’s expected that the new Bell 204B will also operate in South Australia.
Australia buys 20 C-130s from the U.S. — for $6.6 billion
Australia plans to buy 20 new C-130 Hercules aircraft from the United States in a $9.8 billion AUD ($6.6 billion USD) deal that will increase by two-thirds the size of the Royal Australian Air Force’s fleet of its second-largest heavy transport aircraft.
The announcement follows the U.S. Congress approval last year of a larger sale of 24 of the Lockheed Martin-manufactured propellor-driven aircraft.
The U.S. and Australia are conducting their biennial Talisman Sabre military exercise, according to an APNews report, along the Australian coast that this year involves 13 nations and more than 30,000 personnel — as global concerns intensify over an increasingly assertive China.
The first of the new 4-engine C-130s is expected in 2027. The deal was confirmed ahead of a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and their Australian counterparts for annual talks this week in Brisbane.
The Sydney Morning Herald reported that the federal government confirmed the purchase of 20 C-130s to expand and replace the current 12 aircraft operated by Defence. The heavy-lift aircraft can operate with short runways, dropping cargo and delivering personnel. The RAAF first took delivery of a C-130 in 1958, with the current fleet now more than 20 years old. Defence said the dozen existing C-130s would be replaced by 2030 and delivery of the remaining eight would be “subject to the U.S. production schedule.”
The C-130 Hercules have been involved in almost every major Australian Defence operation since they were first purchased, including civilian ops providing COVID vaccines and medical supplies, as well as during bushfires and floods. They are also often used in search and rescue missions.
Back in December, Australia added a new C-130 from Coulson along with a 737 to its resources, after an earlier issue with a C-130 tanker crash. In August of last year Bill Gabbert reported that three Americans were killed in a 2020 New South Wales accident involving the crash of Tanker 134.
Adding two more large airtankers will boost firefighting capability for Western Australia as emergency services personnel prepare for a busy bushfire season. A C-130 Hercules from Coulson Aviation was added on December 5 and is expected to serve in Western Australia (WA) for four seasons. The WA Minister for Emergency Services’ office said the Coulson contract was secured with an $11 million investment to ensure there is a locally based airtanker in the state for the first time.
The Australian Rural & Regional News reported that a Commonwealth-funded Boeing 737 will arrive later this month and will also be based in WA. This arrangement has been secured from the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council National Resource Sharing Centre. Both airtankers can carry more than 15,000 litres — just under 4,000 gallons — of fire suppressant, and both will be based at Busselton-Margaret River Airport in the South-West.
Australia Aerial Firefighting C-130 Hercules Firetanker — Coulson Aviation photo
Western Australia’s aerial fleet comprises 36 rotary and fixed-wing suppression and aerial intelligence aircraft, and for the second consecutive year will feature two Black Hawk helicopters.
File photo of Australian Army soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment deplane from a 5th Aviation Regiment MRH-90 Taipan during Exercise Hamel 2014 at the Tolga Turf Club near Atherton, Queensland. (Photo: Australian Army)
As we reported in February, 2020 and later in December, 2020, a helicopter operated by Australia’s Army inadvertently started a bushfire January 27, 2020 in Namadgi National Park south of Canberra, in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). It was caused by heat from the landing light on an MRH-90 Helicopter as it set down in the remote Orroral Valley for a crew break.
Sentintel-2 satellite imagery of the bushfire in Namadgi National Park south of Canberra, Australia. February 4, 2020.
More information is coming into focus during an ongoing Coroner’s Court, including why the flight crew did not report the fire until after it landed 45 minutes later at an airport.
From the Australian Broadcasting Corporation:
Dramatic accounts of how an army helicopter codenamed Angel 21 started a fire in the Orroral valley in January 2020 during a toilet stop, have emerged from the first day of evidence in the coronial into the disaster.
The fire burned nearly 90,000 hectares (222,000 acres) of the ACT, also burning into the Clear Range in New South Wales, laying waste to farmland along the way.
Counsel Assisting the Coroner Kylie Nomchong told the court the fire started about 1:30pm on January 27 and by 2:25pm it had burned 20 hectares.
She said by later that afternoon, it had burned more than 1,000 hectares and was out of control, and by soon after 6pm, it had burned 18,000 hectares.
It was not put out for five weeks.
On Monday, the court listened to recordings of the crew of the helicopter Angel 21 in the lead-up to the landing and immediately afterwards.
One of the pilots described what he saw as he lifted off the ground.
“The downwash basically worked like a blow torch,” he said.
‘Come up, come up. We’ve started a fire’ The crew of the chopper had been part of Operation Bushfire Assist, in which the Commonwealth was providing resources for the ACT to monitor for fires during the tinder dry conditions in the 2019-2020 summer.
The court heard Angel 21 had been in the air for about two hours checking on the condition of helicopter landing pads, which might be needed if there was a fire, when there was an exchange between the crew members.
“What are the chances of a whiz break?” one of the crew can be heard asking in the recording.
The Coroner’s Court heard it was the decision of another officer to land, but that the pilot flying that day, who gave evidence on Monday, had done a risk assessment and found it to be safe.
But moments later on the ground, a voice is heard saying:
Come up, come up. We’ve started a fire. We’ve started a fire. Turn the search light out.
When asked about the long grass, the pilot said he had not seen it.
The army has admitted it was a light on the helicopter that sparked the fire in the extreme weather conditions that day, and it was revealed some time ago that the unscheduled stop was for a crew break.
The pilot told the court that he knew the searchlight was hot, but was unaware that it could get to 550 degrees Celsius.
Two pilots who gave evidence on Monday said they had been using the searchlight to make sure other aircraft could see them in the smoky hazy conditions that summer.
The court also heard a recording of communications from a fire spotter in a tower nearby, who reported the fire almost immediately.
In his first call he described a column of smoke, and in a later call described it as grey and a bit orange.
Soon afterwards, the ACT’s Emergency Services Agency (ESA) was receiving reports of smoke from residents on Canberra’s southern fringe.
The fire was in an inaccessible area, but local authorities quickly dispatched 19 appliances and 13 aircraft, including water bombers.
It was to no avail.
Chopper couldn’t communicate with ESA, court hears The question before the inquiry is about communications, particularly between the army and the local ESA.
“There is a live issue in this inquiry as to when, if ever, the army told the ESA Angel 21 had ignited the fire,” Ms Nomchong said.
She also said that included the manner in which the fire started and the coordinates of the fire.
The pilot was questioned on Monday about who could be contacted from the aircraft.
He told the court he did have contacts for the ESA officers and the communication systems on board did not provide for contacting them.
Ms Nomchong: “No one on Angel 21 could communicate with the liaison officers at ESA?”.
Pilot: “Correct.”
Ms Nomchong played several recordings of communications between the second pilot and air traffic controllers on the way back to Canberra in which he never mentioned the fire.
She asked him why he didn’t say anything about how the helicopter had started a fire, or give the coordinates.
“My mind was on the safety of the crew and passengers,” he said.
The pilot said he’d been concerned the helicopter had also caught fire and was damaged.
“I was contemplating what was going to happen on landing,” he said. “It was a life and death situation.”
The coronial began in controversial circumstances.
Chief Minister Andrew Barr was against an inquiry, saying he didn’t want a witch hunt.
On Monday Coroner Lorraine Walker opened the hearings saying the object was not to crucify anyone, but rather to make things safer for everyone.
The inquiry is expected to hear from 11 witnesses in total, including from some NSW residents.
Nine NSW residents had previously been excluded from the inquiry because Coroner Lorraine Walker believed her jurisdiction did not cover their interests across the border.
The was overturned by the Supreme Court earlier this year.
Editor’s note 15/11/2022: The coronial inquiry has been put off until 2023, due to unforeseen circumstances which meant Chief Coroner Lorraine Walker was unavailable. The hearing was supposed to run for a week. A new date has yet to be set.
Information from the Air Tactical Group Supervisor about the 2020 accident
70 knot (80 mph) indicated tail wind at 2,700′ agl at Cooma, NSW January 23, 2022. The aircraft was preparing to land at about the same time as the ATGS. Photo taken by a single engine air tanker pilot before landing at Cooma. The speeds, True Air Speed and Ground Speed, are circled, and the photographer’s reflection was obscured.
An aerial firefighter who supervised the use of air tankers and helicopters on the fire at which a C-130 air tanker crashed killing all three on board, told Fire Aviation that hours before, he had ordered the grounding off all firefighting aircraft due to the extreme wind event with “40-knot wind shear and zero visibility.”
On January 23, 2020 at 1:15 p.m. a C-130, Air Tanker 134, Bomber 134 (B134) as it was known in Australia, crashed just after dropping retardant on the Good Good Fire for the Rural Fire Service in New South Wales, Australia.
The person who reported this to Fire Aviation (and asked to remain anonymous) was serving as the Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) at the time, a position that coordinates incident airspace over an incident, manages the air traffic, and is the link between ground personnel and incident aircraft. The ATGS is an airborne firefighter who coordinates, assigns, and evaluates the use of aerial resources in support of incident objectives.
Earlier that morning on January 23 the ATGS had attempted to fly in a helicopter to the Adaminably Fire to evaluate conditions prior to assigning aircraft. Below are excerpts from his email:
Upon lifting we noticed a brown Haboob to the north with extremely stiff headwinds. Only 2-3 minutes out from Polo Flats Air Base in Cooma, the pilot and I looked at each other and each agreed to return to base immediately. When we did we had a hellacious tailwind. Upon turning final our aircraft (AC) was pushed down by wind shear very hard. We landed and had to wait in the AC for 20 mins as the main rotor would not stop spinning (Bell Long Rangers have no rotor brake).
Eventually we got out and struggled to tie the AC down. I entered the Air Base and immediately told the pilots to secure their AC and return to their hotels. This was going to be an all day extreme wind event and we were done for the day. This was at 0917 a.m. (I forever have it noted on my kneeboard.) I notified Cooma FCC [Fire Control Center] of conditions and that I had sent the pilots away. This was within the purview of Air Attacks over there so that was a good day to exercise my power as the “big bad American”. I did this so they would not get pressure to launch all day, as was the custom. It put the already bedraggled pilots at ease and I was glad to take any heat that would’ve come out making a decision to call it off for the day.
Hours later, while eating lunch with my pilots, I got a call from Queanbeyan FCC asking if I had any aircraft up, to which I replied “Hell no, do you?” the reply from them was the same. I was then told of T134 ‘missing’. I rushed to Cooma FCC and very strongly asked why a tanker was sent there in the first place AFTER I shut down all AC due to 40kt wind shear and zero viz. I was incensed. The Good Good fire was dead as well and there were no structures threatened. I saw the real time Firebird footage of the wreckage when it was discovered and almost flew off the handle. I think about those pilots almost daily and wonder, if I was more forceful in my shutdown, perhaps they never would have been dispatched!
In the United States, firefighting aircraft are sometimes dispatched on the initial report of a fire along with ground units depending on the standard operating procedures and the current fire danger. But after a command has been established at the scene additional resources are requested by the Incident Commander on the ground or an ATGS or Air Operations Branch Director.
The person who was the ATGS in NSW on January 23, 2020 explained that aviation resources are deployed differently in that state:
In NSW, the Sydney Air Desk is almost omnipotent and they unilaterally deploy Large Air Tankers (LATs) to a fire in which they believe structures are threatened. This means, as an ATGS, a Birdog and LAT may just show up at your fire hunting for work because the Sydney Air Desk Sent them. It’s terribly flawed.
He said units at a fire could request drops from an air tanker but the process was cumbersome:
You had to put in a request with a starting coordinate and ending coordinate for the requested drop. Once the request was submitted, it could be 24 to 48 hrs before it was approved and then the Bird dog and tanker would show up. Well, at that point, the intended line was typically miles interior and you could not “adjust” the drop so that it was actually on the edge, you had to put in a new request altogether. In short, usage of LATs was very tightly controlled by the Air Desk and it wasn’t at all uncommon for them to unilaterally send LATs to any fire they felt it was necessary. You usually got one drop, there was no load and return, or tag and extend so the drops were all but worthless.
Flight path overview (in white), including the times and locations of where the crew of B134 was in communication with others. From the report.
On that day the C-130, B134, was dispatched by the RFS to the Adaminaby Fire. A 737, Bomber 137, had already dropped there shortly before but reported having experienced uncommanded aircraft rolls up to 45° angle of bank (due to wind) and a windshear warning from the aircraft on-board systems. The B137 crew sent a text message to the bird dog pilot indicating that the conditions were “horrible down there. Don’t send anybody and we’re not going back.” They also reported to the Cooma FCC that the conditions were unsuitable for firebombing operations. During B137’s return flight to Richmond, the Richmond air base manager requested that they reload the aircraft in Canberra and return to Adaminaby. The Pilot in Command (PIC) replied that they would not be returning to Adaminaby due to the weather conditions. A bird dog (lead plane) had been dispatched also but after taking off it refused the assignment due to weather conditions.
The PIC on B134 was aware of the report from B137 but they continued to the Adaminaby Fire. The C-130 was built in 1981 before on-board wind shear warning systems were available, and none had been installed in the following 39 years. After checking out the conditions they refused to drop, saying it was too smoky and windy. Then they were told by the Cooma FCC to drop on the Good Good Fire instead, about 58 km to the east. After arrival, they made three circuits over the fire, then dropped, encountered a strong tail wind and wind shear, stalled, and crashed onto rising terrain, killing all three crewmembers.
B134 flight path showing wind direction and 3-D terrain at the Good Good Fire.
From the ATSB who contacted Fire Aviation:
On that fateful day on the Good Good Fire no tankers were ordered, it was a secondary target that was done in order to avoid jettisoning retardant, which is like liquid gold over there. The prudent thing to do would have been to not launch or, once launched merely jettison the load and return to base instead of casting about in that weather for a target. It’s a very sad situation that was wholly avoidable!
The ATSB told Fire Aviation that he was not interviewed by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau when they were conducting the investigation.
Our Take
This accident is a good example of the James T. Reason’s Swiss cheese model of accident causation. It likens human systems to multiple slices of Swiss cheese, stacked side by side, in which the risk of a threat becoming a reality is mitigated by the differing layers and types of defenses which are “layered” behind each other. Therefore, in theory, lapses and weaknesses in one defense do not allow a risk to materialize, since other defenses also exist, to prevent a single point of failure.
James T. Reason’s Swiss cheese model of accident causation
Over a two or three hour period there were many acts, decisions, and policies that if they had occurred one at a time would not necessarily have caused the fatal crash. Such as:
A standard operating procedure of a person sitting at a desk to routinely make decisions to launch firefighting aircraft sometimes after the initial attack phase without knowledge of conditions that affect safety of flight and the need and likely effectiveness of the drop. They may be thinking, “task them, and let the pilots sort it out”.
A system that encourages an aircraft to continue to an assignment to “check it out for themselves” even after one or more other aircraft have refused the assignment or reported unsafe flying conditions at or en route to the incident.
A system that allows two different Fire Control Centers to dispatch the same aircraft to a fire shortly after the crew reported to one of the FCCs that weather conditions at the fire made air operations unsafe.
Dispatching air tankers when the wind speed would not only result in unsafe operating conditions for aircraft, but would make the drop ineffective by blowing it off target.
Maybe the crew of the C-130 was not aware of the possible wind shear that may have been caused by the ridge west of the fire. Before the drop they made three circuits, at 1,500′, 500′, and 1,000′ AGL before the final pass at 500′ and 144 knots ground speed. Weather observations suggest that after the drop they may have had a tailwind gusting up to 43 knots. The report concluded it was likely the aircraft aerodynamically stalled, resulting in a collision with terrain. The aircraft was not equipped with an on-board wind shear warning system.
The Crew
Captain Ian H. McBeth lived in Great Falls, Montana and served with the Wyoming Air National Guard and was still a member of the Montana Air National Guard. He spent his entire career flying C-130’s and was a qualified Instructor and Evaluator pilot. Ian earned his Initial Attack qualification for Coulson in 2018.
First Officer Paul Clyde Hudson of Buckeye, Arizona graduated from the Naval Academy in 1999 and spent the next twenty years serving in the United States Marine Corp in a number of positions including C-130 pilot. He retired as a Lt. Colonel.
Flight Engineer Rick A. DeMorgan Jr. lived in Navarre, Florida. He served in the United States Air Force for eighteen years as a Flight Engineer on the C-130. Rick had over 4,000 hours as a Flight Engineer with nearly 2,000 hours in a combat environment.
Three Americans were killed in the 2020 New South Wales accident
Accident circuit of B134 showing wind direction.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has released their final report on the January 23, 2020 crash of a C-130, Air Tanker 134, Bomber 134 (B134) as it was known in Australia. All three crewmembers were killed just after dropping retardant on a fire for the Rural Fire Service (RFS) in New South Wales, Australia.
It was very windy on January 23, with a forecast for the possibility of mountain waves. Before the incident a bird dog, similar to a lead plane, and Bomber 137 (B137), a Boeing 737, was tasked to drop on a fire in the Adaminaby area. Based on the weather the bird dog pilot declined the assignment. After B137 made a drop on the fire, the crew reported having experienced uncommanded aircraft rolls up to 45° angle of bank (due to wind) and a windshear warning from the aircraft on-board systems.
Flight path of N134CG (white). Source: Google Earth, Aireon and RFS tracking data, annotated by the ATSB.
After completing the drop, the B137 crew sent a text message to the bird dog pilot indicating that the conditions were “horrible down there. Don’t send anybody and we’re not going back.” They also reported to the Cooma FCC that the conditions were unsuitable for firebombing operations. During B137’s return flight to Richmond, the Richmond air base manager requested that they reload the aircraft in Canberra and return to Adaminaby. The Pilot in Command (PIC) replied that they would not be returning to Adaminaby due to the weather conditions.
Tanker 134 at Medford, Oregon July 27, 2019. Photo by Tim Crippin.
B134 was also dispatched to the fire at Adaminaby. While they were in route, the PIC of B137 called to inform them of the actual conditions, and that B137 would not be returning to Adaminaby.
After arriving at Adaminaby, the PIC of B134 contacted the air operations officer at the Cooma FCC by radio and advised them that it was too smoky and windy to complete a retardant drop at that location.
The Cooma air operations officer then provided the crew with the location of the Good Good Fire, about 58 km to the east of Adaminaby, with the objective of conducting structure and property protection near Peak View. Again, there was no birddog operating with the air tanker.
The C-130 went to Peak View as the only aircraft on scene. After dropping a partial load of retardant out of the 4,000-gallon tank the aircraft then made a left turn which resulted in a tail wind and it climbed for approximately 10 seconds to about 170 feet above the drop height. Following this, the aircraft was observed descending. It was seen at a very low height above the ground, in a slight left bank, immediately followed by a significant left roll as the left wing struck a tree just before ground impact. The three crewpersons were fatally injured and the aircraft destroyed.
The report’s findings
The ATSB determined from a combination of witness video and real-time position and flight path data, that the aircraft’s climb performance degraded. Subsequently, while at a low height and airspeed, it was likely the aircraft aerodynamically stalled, resulting in a collision with terrain. In the limited time available, the remainder of the fire-retardant load was not jettisoned prior to the aircraft stalling.
As there were only about 10 seconds between the climb performance degrading and the likely stall, there was limited time available for the crew to identify and respond to the situation. Past research shows pilot recognition time of windshear can be expected to be about 5 seconds, and the emergency dump function would take a further 2 seconds. However, in the absence of the cockpit audio recording, it could not be determined if the crew had considered or called for an emergency dump of the remaining load. Therefore, for reasons undetermined, the remaining 25,000 pounds of retardant was not jettisoned during the accident sequence.
The ATSB established that jettisoning the remaining load would have lowered the stall speed and optimised the aircraft’s climb performance. This was also confirmed from the simulator testing. Nonetheless, it was not possible to determine if jettisoning the remaining load, taking into account the time available, and typical recognition and response times, would have prevented the collision with terrain. The outcome of the July 1, 2012 crash in South Dakota of MAFFS 7, a US Air Force C-130 where the crew did jettison the load, is an example of when this action may not be sufficient to avoid a collision with terrain.
B134 flight path showing wind direction and 3-D terrain.
Beginning on page 17, the report includes a lengthy discussion about wind shear and mountain waves. It defines wind shear as “a wind direction and/or speed change over a vertical or horizontal distance.”
From the report on page 21:
“The accident aircraft was not fitted with a windshear detection system as it was built in 1981, prior to such technology becoming available. Likewise, the operator’s other C-130 aircraft did not have this system. Retrofitted systems suitable for the C-130 have since become available. However, the operator advised that they had not considered installing these systems into their C-130 fleet. Further, it was not required by regulation or contract to be installed.
“On 10 July 2022, in response to the draft report, Coulson Aviation advised that aerial firefighting operate in very dry environments conducive to active fires. Therefore, with minimal or nil moisture present in the atmosphere it could be concluded that a forward-looking windshear detection system would provide little to no advance warning of a windshear event. They further indicated that their crews were highly experienced in recognising windshear events and crew reaction times would be as timely, if not quicker than a reactive-based system. The operator further advised that this statement was based on ‘rational conclusion’ based on experience supported by informed opinion. The ATSB was unable identify any research that supported this comment.”
While the New South Wales RFS was not an aviation organization or directly responsible for flight safety, they were closely involved in the aerial operation, being responsible for determining the task objectives and selecting aircraft for the task. The ATSB found that the RFS had limited large air tanker policies and procedures for aerial supervision requirements and no procedures for deployment without aerial supervision. In addition, they did not have a policy or procedures in place to manage task rejections, nor to communicate this information internally or to other pilots working in the same area of operation. Such policies and associated procedures would provide frontline personnel with the required steps to effectively and safely manage taskings, and provide guidance for decision-making.
It was also identified that while not applicable to the accident crew, the RFS procedures allowed aircraft operators to determine when pilots were initial attack capable. This was inconsistent with their intention for pilots to be certified by the United States Forest Service certification process.
The ATSB also determined that the New South Wales Rural Fire Service had limited large air tanker policies and procedures for aerial supervision requirements and no procedures for deployment without aerial supervision. The RFS did not have a policy or procedures in place to manage task rejections, nor to communicate this information internally or to other pilots working in the same area of operation.
While not contributing to the accident, the aircraft’s cockpit voice recorder did not record the accident flight and had not worked for weeks or more after having being automatically triggered off by some event during training flights. This resulted in a valuable source of safety information not being available to the investigation, which not only increased the time taken to determine contributing factors to the accident but also limited the extent to which important safety issues could be identified and analysed.
What has been done as a result
As a result of this investigation, Coulson Aviation has incorporated a windshear recovery procedure into their C-130 Airplane Flight Manuals and plan to introduce simulator-based recurrent windshear training. Related to the consideration of risk in aerial firefighting operations, they have also implemented a pre-flight risk assessment to be completed by the pilot in command prior to the first tasking of the day. They will also be introducing a three-tiered risk management approach of organizational risk, operational risk, and tactical/mission risk, to be utilized during the upcoming fire season in Australia. Further, Coulson Aviation has updated their pre-flight procedures to incorporate a cockpit voice recorder system check before each flight. Lastly, the Retardant Aerial Delivery System software was reprogrammed so that the system will not require re-arming between partial load drops where less than 100% was selected.
The ATSB has issued two safety recommendations to Coulson Aviation. These are to further consider:
Fitment of a windshear detection system to their C-130 aircraft to minimise the time taken for crews to recognise and respond to an encounter particularly when operating at low-level and low speed;
Incorporating foreseeable external factors into their pre-flight assessment tool to ensure the overall risk profile of a tasking can be consistently assessed by crews.
The New South Wales Rural Fire Service advised the ATSB that they intend to take the following actions in response to this accident:
Commissioned an independent report into the management of airspace in which aircraft are operating in support of fire-fighting activities;
Formalize and establish a “Large Air Tanker Co-ordinator” role description, to be positioned on the State Air Desk during heightened fire activity;
Undertake an immediate audit, in conjunction with operators, of pilots qualified as initial attack capable and ensure appropriate records are accessible by RFS personnel;
Undertake detailed research to identify best practice (nationally and internationally) relating to task rejection and aerial supervision policies and procedures as well as initial attack training and certification.
Undertake a comprehensive review of RFS aviation doctrine to incorporate outcomes of the above-mentioned research into existing policies and procedures;
Promulgate the revised doctrine detailing the task rejection policies and procedures and aerial supervision requirements to all operational personnel, pilots/aircrew and other key stakeholders. This is to be reinforced at the aviation operators briefing held annually prior to the bushfire season;
Provide the National Aerial Firefighting Centre and national fire-fighting agencies with copies of the updated doctrine relating to these issues.
While the ATSB acknowledges the commitment to undertake reviews and research, at the time of publication the New South Wales Rural Fire Service had not yet committed to adopting any safety action that would reduce the risk associated with the three identified safety issues to an acceptable level. As such, the ATSB has issued three safety recommendations to the RFS to take further action:
To address the absence of policies and procedures for personnel to effectively manage and communicate task rejections on the basis of operational safety concerns;
To address the absence of policies and procedures regarding minimum aerial supervision requirements and the use of initial attack to assist frontline staff with making acceptable risk-based tasking decisions;
To address the ambiguity with the interpretation of “initial attack” in NSW and the Australian Capital Territory Aviation Standard Operating Procedures.
Britton Coulson, Co-President of Coulson Aviation, told Wildfire Today, “We worked very closely with the ATSB to provide them with all the information that they requested. We are pleased that they acknowledged the progress we made with their recommendations.”
Fire and Rescue New South Wales (FRNSW) crews across the State are being trained to use state-of-the-art drone technology to assist in firefighting operations and other emergencies.
“These drones are being deployed to 25 regional areas, giving FRNSW crews an eye in the sky to help them better fight fires and keep our communities safe,” said Minister for Emergency Services and Resilience and Minister for Flood Recovery Steph Cooke. “The drones are connected to FRNSW’s wireless and satellite communication networks, allowing images to be viewed and analysed in real time at the scene of an emergency which helps firefighters make quicker decisions and act faster.”
The investment is part of the NSW government’s response to its Bushfire Inquiry recommendations, with $5.2 million earmarked in the state budget to expand the drone program with new aviation staff, training and equipment.
The aircraft are equipped with thermal imaging cameras and laser technology that can detect variable heat temperatures, identify people or animals under threat in a fire zone, and measure the size of an area impacted by fire.
Fire Rescue New South Wales drone.
FRNSW Bushfire and Aviation Unit Commander Scott Donohoe said the drones can be activated at an emergency scene within minutes.
“The drones are stored in our vehicles and ready for immediate use, providing FRNSW commanders with aerial images that can help determine the safest and most effective places to position fire trucks and crews,” Superintendent Donohoe said.
“We are planning to have around 200 firefighters trained to pilot the drones. The available training over several tiers includes sessions on night flying, situational awareness, live streaming, rapid mapping, aerial incendiary use, and 3D panoramic skills.”
The drones can be used to assess bush fire risk, assist in hazard reduction operations, and find people missing in dense bushland.
The drones have already been deployed to the Northern Rivers region to assess flood-damaged infrastructure, identify hazardous materials, and find leftover debris.
A UH-1H that crashed earlier this year in Tasmania had a fragmented drive shaft
Fragmented KAflex from the accident helicopter, source Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued a Safety Advisory Notice related to the fatal crash of a Garlick Helicopters UH-1H that was assisting firefighters on February 14, 2022 southeast of Pipers Brook, Tasmania. Andrew Kerr, the only person on board, was killed.
The helicopter was working with an external water bucket when witnesses both on the ground and within a nearby helicopter observed the early release of the water load from the bucket, before the UH-1H commenced a left turn and descended toward nearby open terrain. The helicopter was then observed to slow and enter a hover, then rapidly yaw, before descending and impacting terrain. The pilot was fatally injured and the helicopter was destroyed.
A local resident, Michael McKenna was working in his shed when the incident happened.
“I heard this big bang, something wasn’t right,” he said. “I got to the corner of the house and I saw the helicopter go down.”
The helicopter that crashed February 14, 2022, VH-UHX. Photo supplied by ATSB.
The ATSB’s on-site examination of the wreckage found anomalies with the helicopter’s main drive shaft, identified as a KAflex and manufactured in the United States by Kamatics Corporation (Kamatics), that transmits engine power to the transmission. The shaft was found to have fragmented during the accident sequence, with four of the flex-frame attaching hardware (nuts, bolts, and their washers) and portions of the flexible frame elements unable to be accounted at the accident site. The ATSB subsequently commenced a detailed technical examination of the KAflex shaft assembly and importantly, severe frictional and wear damage was identified to have occurred to one portion of the shaft. The results of that work was presented to Kamatics and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).
The ATSB issued a Safety Advisory Notice June 15, 2022 advising operators of UH-1H helicopters to note the preliminary details of this accident, the content of AD 2021-26-16 and CASA Airworthiness Bulletin AWB 63-004, and to look for the presence of, corrosion, fretting, frame cracking, missing or damaged flex-frame attaching hardware during all inspections of the KAflex drive shaft. Any identified defects should be reported to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the ATSB.
FAA earlier pointed out issues with UH-1H drive shafts
On January 20, 2022 a few weeks before the crash in Australia, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration issued an airworthiness directive (AD) requiring inspection or replacement of the main driveshaft in certain type certificated Model UH-1H restricted category helicopters that have KAflex main driveshaft part number (P/N) SKCP2180-1, SKCP2281-1, SKCP2281-1R, or SKCP2281-103 installed.
The AD requires establishing a limit to replace the driveshafts, and one-time and repetitive inspections. If the main driveshaft has accumulated 5,000 or more total hours in service (TIS), before further flight it must be replaced or overhauled.
The AD referenced two in-flight failures of the driveshaft that occurred during logging operations in 1997 and 2015.
The FAA estimated the cost of replacing the driveshaft is $54,000 if new, or $38,000 for one that has been overhauled.
